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Abstract
OnLine Social Networking sites (SNS) hold a vast amount of information that individuals and organisations post
about themselves. Investigations include SNS as sources of evidence and the challenge is to have effective tools to
extract the evidence. In this exploratory research we apply the latest version of a proprietary tool to identify
potential evidence from five SNS using three different browsers. We found that each web browser influenced the
scope of the evidence extracted. In previous research we have shown that different open source and proprietary
tools influence the scope of evidence obtained. In this research we asked, What variation in the scope of evidence
extraction can be expected between different browsers? The implications of this exploratory research is for
precaution. The choice of a web browser used to investigate a SNS directly influences the scope of digital evidence
obtained.
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INTRODUCTION
Online social networks are forums hosted on the Internet that provide easiness and effectiveness for unlimited
amounts of users to share information in digital forms such as images, texts, links, audios, and videos. In simple
terms they are massive communication platforms (Cheung and Lee, 2010). The use social media has become
pervasive in the lives of many users and an extension of their real lives. There are many different online social
networks with different purposes of use but all communicate information about the individual, the organisation and
their networks of association. The largest one Facebook had over 1.5 billion users in May 2015 (Chen, Xu, Yuan,
and Shashidar, 2015). Many users of these sites have become psychologically attached to the interaction and the
self-promotion to a point where they freely post information about themselves, including pictures, status, comments,
locations, beliefs, opinions and feelings. Some of these communications may be exaggerations or fabricated using
information tools but many users are simply conveying stories in various forms about themselves, the organisation
and their communities ( ). The nature of the medium provides a sense of security and personal safety in which the
constraints of normal social settings are often absent. In this context much information is available that would not
always be accessible by standard investigation techniques such as interviews and observations. In a standard
interview situation cues are present that can inhibit or facilitate conversation and the recollect of events. The
proximity of relationships in such situations often colours the tone and texture of what is recorded. In the online
situation the spatial proximity of others may be distant or non-existent. The user conveys their own ideas and beliefs
about matters in a mobile non-space with only the influence of the online community and perceptions of others built
up from previous experience of online interaction. In some instances the user is conveying information on behalf of
others such as business advertising or communications for those without an account but in every instance the user
mediates the situation. As such the user is in a position of power, can earn trust and can act as an authority in
matters unknown. In simple terms the user feels important and capable to declare truths (Wang, Woo, Lui, Quak,
Yang, 2012).
From a forensic point of view, online social networks are a potential source of evidence that can help during
investigation (Yue et al., 2014). There are many instances where employers, statuary authorities and others have
consulted social networking evidence before making judgements (Zainudin et al., 2010). Organisations have also
encouraged members to maintain social network sites to communicate and promote brand (Dar and Shah, 2013).
Many work performance appraisals include both positive and negative feedback based on online social performance
(Mingming, 2014). These feedback are based on “likes”, numbers of followers, numbers of retweets, and so on. As
a consequence there is a huge amount of data available online surrounding individuals and any other created entity
such as political parties, brands, clubs, charities, and so on. The access to some of the data is controlled by privacy
settings and privileges but in general there is an enormous amount of data available. Not surprisingly searching and
sorting through the entangled medium is a big part of digital investigation. Social engineering has also played a role
in weakening the protections of privacy and often social networks that are perceived to be secure are only as strong
as the weakest link who may decide to disclose sensitive information. Publically reported cases of mass hacking of
passwords has led to the disclosure of sensitive documents, images and audio clips that were only intended for the
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select social group (Zhang, Choudhary, and Grudin, 2014). All of these matters show that online social networks
contain a multiplicity of evidence that can be accessed in many ways. The evidential value is moderated by the
potential for over-inflated claims, digital make-overs and flaring; but the amount of data available and the
improvement in extraction and analysis tools is making the source unavoidable.
This paper is structured to review previous literature, define the test set up and to report the results. The focus of the
research is to identify the effect the use of a particular web browser has on the scope of evidence. The results are
then discussed to elicit the implications for practice. The conclusion is that social networking site (SNS) digital
forensic tools have to be used with caution and the interpretation of findings moderated to allow for variations
caused by web browser effects and tool effects.

PREVIOUS LITERATURE
The introductory section has defined and described the characteristics of SNS. This section is concerned with the
identification of evidence that may be found on a SNS. The opportunity to collect evidence from SNS is no different
than any other digital forensic collection activity and it must comply with standardised criteria for acceptance. The
five Daubert criteria are often cited as helpful guidelines for assuring evidence (Cohen, 2010). Although these are
certainly helpful overriding guidelines for technical performance, legislation in the form of a jurisdiction Evidence
Act, for example, may take priority. If the evidence has been collected in an unacceptable social sense where
coercion has been used or reasonable privacy breeched; or where spoliation may have occurred, then the evidence
becomes unacceptable (Jang and Kwok, 2014). The investigator has to comply both with the IT technical criteria,
the legal framework and due processes to assure admissibility. In the following two sub sections the previous
literature on SNS tool testing is reviewed and the type of digital evidence available summarised.

TOOL EVIDENCE COLLECTION
In previous literature variations between tool performances for extracting digital evidence from SNS have been
reported. The findings show that the capability of three widely available tools for evidence extraction in SNS varied
greatly under test conditions. The experiment was set up using standardised tool testing algorithms (see Table 1).
The capabilities of digital forensic tools to perform examination and extraction of social networking artefacts was
measured. The overall top performing tool was EnCase Forensic which was able to automatically examine and
extract an average of 89.6% of all SNS artefacts. It also had a perfect rating of 3/3 for all test cases. The
comprehensive Internet history search was a useful technique to isolate SNS related artefacts and in two scenarios
the provided scripting language EnScript was use to code and facilitate the extraction.
Table 1. Test Cases for Forensic Tool Testing
Test Case #

Test Case Name

Tested Tool Functionality

TC01

SNS History Analysis

Provide detailed list of SNS URLs accessed.

TC02

Web Browser Cache Analysis

Automatically examine and decode Web browser cache for
SNS information, data and files.

TC03

SNS Session Analysis

Locate Internet session artefacts created by SNS interaction.

TC04

Facebook Chat Analysis

Automatically examine evidence for Facebook chat
messages.

TC05

Repeatability & Reproducibility

Tool achieves same results consistently.

CacheBack also performed well at automatically examining SNS artefacts, with an average of 75.2% of all artefacts
extracted. Internet Evidence Finder (IEF) is designed to be run on a live system, and did not process static forensic
image files as used in the testing. The result was a poor performance and the requirement to mount the forensic
image for evidence extraction. These results all have implication for evidence scope. Each of the three tools also
faced challenges in the area of web browser compatibility and interoperability. Table 2 summarises the performance
findings.
Table 2. Summary of Findings: Automated Examination Capabilities of Tools
IEF

CacheBack
Scenario
TC01

EnCase

Score

Rating

Score

Rating

Score

Rating

58.2%

2

21.4%

1

93.2%

3
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TC02

31.8%

1

0.6%

1

87.8%

3

TC03

86.1%

3

0%

0

92%

3

TC04

100%

3

50%

2

75%

3

TC05

100%

3

100%

3

100%

3

Total Weighted

75.2%

12

34.4%

7

89.6%

Ranking

2

nd

3

rd
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The Type of Evidence Stored In A SNS
The type of data that can be found in SNS is impressive. We have listed categories in previous articles but a short
review would include the following. Five working categories are (Mumba and Venter, 2014):
Service data: Data that has to be provided by users to continue using the social network site, examples of
data is legal name, Date of Birth, and phone numbers and so on.
Disclosed data: Any data posted by the account user, it could be presented in any format such as pictures,
videos, links, comments, and updating status.
Entrusted data: Any data posted by someone else to a user account (friends, subscribers, followers etc.). The
difference between Disclosed and Entrusted data is that the user does not have control over the entrusted data
once it’s been posted.
Incidental data: Incidental data is what other people write in their account about a particular user. Again the
data could be anything, pictures, messages, videos, and so on.
Behavioural data: The data collected by the site about users’ practises and habits. By recording their
activities, choices, regular habits, points of views and so on.
The types of evidence can vary from one SNS to another depending on their architecture and the features provided.
The different data sources that that can be collected from online social networks, which may lead to acceptable
evidence during a forensic investigation can be grouped into five areas (Zainudin, Merabti and Jones, 2010).
Social footprint with other users, including friend lists, connected groups, who are the followers, and
following who.
Communication methods between the users within the site, e.g. private messages, instant messenger,
comments, likes, group communications, and events.
Pictures and videos posted by the users, and who were tagged in the pictures, what other pictures a certain
user was tagged on.
The times of activities: when a specific user logged on into the site, and what sort of activities were
performed in a specific time frame.
The applications used by the user, and identifying the purpose of the used apps, and what information can be
deduce in the social context.
The evidence may be spread in a variety of locations some of which may be inaccessible. Online social networking
sites exploit the services of cloud providers leaving potential sources of information lost in the complexity of
commercial arrangements and service level agreements. A traditional investigation would have relied on browser
forensic techniques to access a large percentage of the potential evidence on a user’s hard drive. However the newer
information architectures suggest that RAM dumping and cloud investigation techniques are also required.

TEST SETUP
The research is to investigate the variation in scope of different web browsers to extract digital evidence. The test
context was the University laboratory using one PC and the network that is available to all University users. Each
web browser was checked for the standard out of the box configurations before use. In this way we sought to
generalise the experience any user may have on the network when accessing the five SNS with the three different
web browsers. The test environment was set up using accounts created for the purpose of the research on five
different SNS (Facebook; Twitter; Instagram; Linkin; Bayt). Consequently the data reported is all fictitious scenario
based and with no real owners. Three web browsers were tested to observe the scope of evidence extraction. The
web browsers were selected from the four most popular web browsers in 2015 (Statcounter.com, 2015). The
popularity rank was reported as Chrome (50%), Internet Explorer (IE) (12%), Firefox (10%), Safari (13%).
Consequently Chrome, Firefox and IE were selected based on availability and platform. The techniques from
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Browser Forensic investigation were employed, such as RAM dumping, Cache analysis from the PC, and so on. In
figure 1 the phases of investigation are shown to communicate the scope of enquiry. The focus was on site evidence
availability and web browser extraction capability.
The researchers played case scenarios to populate the sites with potential evidence and also to control the amount
and type of data for discovery before the tests began. In this way the web browsers could be assessed against the
potential evidence present and ranked. In the first phase the IT artefacts were defined and the data types identified
and posted. The second phase determined the tests and scenarios. The evidence was subsequently stored on a hard
drive and in the PC 8Gb RAM. In phase three the hard drive was imaged and the RAM dumped for analysis in
Phase 4. Phase 5 was the research report. The Third phase acquisition and extraction of evidence was performed
based on NIST forensic best practice guidelines. The Fourth phase included a reconstruction of the evidence against
the research scenarios (see figure 1). The following hardware and software were used:








Darik and Nuke wiping utility tool for zeroing the suspect hard drive before conducting the scenarios
(Generating the controlled data).
Windows 7 professional with 32-bit Operating System is installed on the suspect computer, and latest
versions of IE, Chrome, and Firefox.
FTK imager light 3.1.1: used for acquiring RAM memory of suspect’s computer.
AccessData® FTK® Imager 2.9.0.138: used for creating an image of memory dump and the acquired hard
drives and to verify the integrity of the image by calculating MD5 and SHA1 values.
Tableau eSATA forensic bride: A forensic SATA/IDE bridge model T35es is used to acquire computer
hard drive in forensic manner where the evidence is not altered or changed.
Tableau Imager 1.11: To acquire the computer’s hard with the use of tableau eSATA forensic bridge.
Belkasoft Evidence Center 7.3: used for analyzing OSNs evidence from the suspect’s computer.

Figure 1. Research Phases

THE RESULTS
The experiment confirms that the types and amounts of data that can be found in SNSs is large. It is also
comprehensive and descriptive. However, the results show that not all data can be accessed and that different web
browsers find different and different amounts of data. In the experiment some of the posted data was not found at
all. The RAM, pagefile.sys, and hard drive were all searched for evidence and because we had set the experiment up
knowing what could be found the web browser limitations became explicit. The figure 2 summarizes the percentage
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of forensic evidence found with each web browser. The data is further differentiated into SNS (colour code) and
location.

Figure 2. Forensic Evidence found from difference sources and different web browsers

DISCUSSION
The results in figure 2 show considerable variation between web browsers and SNS when evidence discovery is
required. Each web browser was configured and used in the fashion described in the set up section. Across the three
web browsers Firefox and Chrome performed effectively for the SNS Twitter but did not show any remarkable
performances for the other four SNS. Internet Explorer similarly stood out as underperforming on all SNS. It can be
argued that Internet Explorer was more consistent across the five SNS than the other two web browsers but in terms
of a high 95% or better discovery rate, it fell well short. The results from the study have to be read with the
limitations described in the set up section and the best advice to a Digital Forensic Investigator is cautioned with
these limitations. In practice the results suggest that a range of web browsers should be used to provide the best
scope of discovery and Internet Explorer can provide a baseline from which to work. The consistency across SNS
and storage devices suggests that affair indication of where to look may be established. Once the baseline is set then
a Digital Forensic Investigator can use other web browsers to search more thoroughly in the target areas.
The tools a digital investigator uses for extracting evidence from a SNS determine the scope of the evidence
acquired. Previously published experimental results show that the choice of evidence extraction and analysis tools
sets determine what is found from a SNS. In this research the experiment shows that the scope is further influenced
by the type of SNS, the web browser and where the evidence is stored. The results showed that the easiest SNS to
extract evidence was Instagram and the hardest LinkedIn. Other extreme variations were noted when Firefox and
Chrome web browsers were used on the Bayt SNS. The extraction of evidence from different locations is consistent
across the RAM, pagefily.sys and hard drive for Internet explorer but variable for Chrome and Firefox. This
suggests that again the web browser used by the investigator is to impact the scope of evidence obtained. The clear
message from figure 2 analysis is that with the exception of Instagram over 50% of the structured evidence was not
extracted by any of the three web browsers in the experiment. This is a very large proportion and of material
influence when reporting evidence obtained from a SNS. A professional investigator is to demonstrate in practice
the scientific methods used to extract the evidence so another can extract the same evidence using the same
methods. However it is problematic that if another expert using the same web browser with the same configurations
would find the same evidence or if a different web browser performed the same method the same evidence would be
extracted.
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The implications of these findings is for further caution and preparation by investigators when collecting evidence
from SNS. The technical report of findings has to include a specification of the web browser(s) used and the version
numbers so that another expert can best chance replicate the method and procedures to obtain the same evidence.
More worrying however, is the potential for Judges and Juries to simply take evidence extracted from SNS at face
value and assume it has the same status as digital evidence from traditional sources. SNS introduce extra layers of
complexity that may not yet be fully understood and planned for in digital evidence extraction. The extent and
limitations currently found in digital evidence extraction tools and web browsers can seriously limited the scope of
what may be obtained. An incomplete picture of an event may provide items of interest but cannot tell the whole
story. In addition the way people can behave online places limitations on the value of the evidence. Previously
mentioned behaviours such as flaring, bragging, serialising, fantasising and so on limit the reality factor associated
with any posted data. Such semantic slippage and detached referrals may fuel a defence case that alleges planting of
evidence and the fabricating of charges. The worst case situation leaves an SNS user vulnerable to a multiplicity of
theories of the evidence and consequently accountable to unrelated accusations. The implications of these findings
is for caution when extracting and reporting evidence from SNS. An investigator may use multiple tools and web
browsers but still has to accept that a comprehensive search of a SNS for evidence remains incomplete.

CONCLUSION
There are many cases where people have used online social networks to reveal their admission of committing
offenses. Often the motivation is to brag or to seek popularity. The social networks people disclose online also have
the links to others who influence their behaviour and those with whom they exert influence. Of course there are
many strengths of relationship within any online social network but the nature of trust and apparent removal of the
usual barriers to expression allows the disclosure of important information. In this research we show that caution
must be taken when evidence is extracted and reported from SNSs. The performance variations between the web
browsers tested were significant and indicative of the potential web browser effect impact. The conclusions provide
a warning for professional practice and increased awareness for potential loss and spoliation of evidence when
investigating SNS.
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